Read the segment by reading the program stack. Lockheed Martin's FY2025 Form 10-K names the programs that constitute its Space business segment and adjacent strategic-missile work: the Trident II D5 Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM); Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen OPIR); the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI); the Orion crew vehicle for NASA; GPS III, the program to modernize the GPS satellite system for the U.S. Space Force; and hypersonics programs. For a prime, the segment is not an abstraction — it is the sum of these named, multi-year programs.

The segment table gives those programs a size and a direction. The 10-K reports Space net sales of $13,029 million in 2025, up $550 million, or 4%, from $12,479 million in 2024, with operating profit of $1,345 million (up $119 million, or 10%) and operating margin improving to 10.3% from 9.8%. Year-end backlog rose to $39,822 million from $36,377 million — roughly three years of sales committed, and growing for a second straight year. Space is one of Lockheed's four reporting segments and, at about $13 billion, a material slice of the company's total, with a backlog that has climbed from $30,456 million in 2023 to $36,377 million in 2024 to $39,822 million in 2025 — a third of the runway added in two years.

The net-sales bridge shows exactly which programs in the stack moved the line. The 10-K attributes about $380 million of the 2025 increase to "strategic and missile defense programs due to the ramp on the NGI program and higher volume on FBM," and about $255 million to "commercial and civil space programs due to higher volume (primarily Orion)." Those gains were partially offset by $135 million of lower national security space sales tied to "changes in the program lifecycle on the OPIR mission." So within a 4% segment number sit two ramping development-to-production franchises (NGI, FBM), a growing exploration program (Orion), and a maturing satellite line (OPIR) — divergent trajectories the headline alone would hide.

Each named line has a different revenue character, and the filing's descriptions make that legible. The 10-K calls FBM "the only submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile currently in production in the U.S." — a sustainment-and-production franchise with a long tail. NGI is "a program with the Missile Defense Agency utilizing next generation propulsion and sensors to provide homeland missile defense," a development program ramping toward production risk and reward. GPS III is a modernization franchise with a defined production tail; Orion is NASA's "next generation exploration-class crewed vehicle"; and hypersonics is described as "several programs with the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army to design, develop and build hypersonic strike weapons" — the fastest-growing volume story in the strategic-missile mix.

An earlier filing quantified part of that hypersonics-and-FBM ramp directly. The Q3 2024 Form 10-Q attributed higher net sales of "$270 million for strategic and missile defense programs due to higher volume on the hypersonics and FBM programs" — a concrete, verbatim read on the volume that the FY2025 10-K later showed continuing through the NGI ramp. Read together, the interim and annual filings trace the same strategic-missile franchise compounding across periods rather than spiking in one.

The operating-profit bridge adds a margin nuance worth carrying. The 10-K credits roughly $175 million of the 2025 profit increase to commercial civil space and government satellite programs, "reflecting favorable performance at completion on certain commercial civil space programs recognized in the first and second quarters of 2025" — risk retirements landing early in the year. That was partially offset by $40 million of lower equity earnings from Lockheed's investment in United Launch Alliance, whose total equity earnings the filing says were "not significant in 2025," down from $45 million a year earlier. For a markets reader, that detail matters: part of Space's profit comes through an equity-method launch joint venture, so the segment's earnings are not purely organic, and a soft ULA year can mask or offset operating gains on the core program stack.

The forward signal is in the proxy. Lockheed's 2026 proxy statement repeatedly foregrounds space, hypersonics, AI, autonomy and advanced communications as the capability priorities tied to executive and strategic focus — a tell that the program stack described in the 10-K is where management intends to push growth and capital. When a company's pay-and-strategy disclosures emphasize the same franchises the segment table is already ramping, the two documents corroborate each other — the proxy tells you where management's attention and incentives point, and the 10-K confirms the revenue is already following.

The disciplined read: Lockheed's Space and strategic-missile segment is a portfolio of named programs at different maturities, and the 10-K plus proxy together let you see which are ramping (NGI, FBM, hypersonics) versus modernizing (GPS III) versus developing-to-flight (Orion) versus winding through a lifecycle change (OPIR). Backlog is forward revenue; the $39.8 billion book and the program stack tell you which programs will convert it, and the margin step-up to 10.3% says the conversion is getting more profitable. Track segment net sales, year-end backlog, and the NGI and Orion ramps in particular, while watching the OPIR lifecycle change and ULA equity earnings as the two items most likely to offset gains elsewhere. For a markets reader, the value of the program-stack approach is that it turns a single 4% segment number into a map of which franchises are funding the next several years of revenue and which are rolling off. Records on sec.gov, surfaced by SEC filings.